>Investment is now running into sharply diminishing returns
This can be seen quite clearly in the rising ICOR [1] numbers. The stimulus lead investment since the crisis has been substantially less productive, at least in the short term [2]. Infrastructure and real-estate investment is doing much less for future GDP growth than prior investments in capital equipment for manufacturing, exports etc.
The bigger concern in the financing of this investment binge. IMO there is a very real risk of substantial civil unrest in China when the massive credit bubble comes apart.
The FT put out a much more extensive treatment of these issues a couple of days ago:
It talks about the lack of spending power of consumer because of low wages, and gains all flood into elite class and national enterprises. My observation is that it's seemed almost like "directed" or "forced" consumption to stimulate economy - a consumption without average consumers, or people really have very little role to it. Prove is that the real-estate expansion bubble, empty buildings and cities. It's like a hack of economy for super growth with very little risk. I think it's a complete violation of nature, but effects can vary... my prediction of one significant effect is that there will be very little innovation come out from China for next 20 years. I think they've thought of it, and don't care as it is not a primary concern for them at this point in time. And I don't think this hack is as good as it is thought to be, the risk has been reduced in the short-term, but it's somewhat cumulative, and it's going to be very dangerous in long-term.
Back to topic of this article... I can see the wall, but it's so huge that distance cannot be determined. Maybe when China about to hit, they might come up with something. After all, control is their weapon, and it can be extremely effective.
With Japan, they had seriously begun the process of industrialization in the 1800's with the Meiji Period [1]. So even though their economy and infrastructure was gravely damaged during WW2, they could rebuild quickly.
With South Korea, I don't know. It was a much smaller country. Being a close ally of the USA may have helped with foreign investment which allowed them to climb up the value curve very quickly. I found this on post-WW2 South Korean economic development [2], but haven't gone through the whole thing yet.
Wow, I'm as much a skeptic of China's economic model as anyone can be, but this article is just saying words with 1) nothing to back them up, and 2) an overt 'no, america isn't anything like this! don't be silly!'.
I mean:
(Since someone is going to raise this issue: no, this
bears very little resemblance to the Federal Reserve’s
policies here.
Really? When an article is written as 'factual' in a 'factual' tone, but contains stupid little personal interjections in it like this, I get :'( face about the fall of journalistic standards.
Needs 'opinion piece, may not reflect reality' at the top.
The backing data is Krugman being a nobel prize winning economist whose been incredibly accurate for the last decade and a half. I'm sure you know more than him though shadowmint.
This can be seen quite clearly in the rising ICOR [1] numbers. The stimulus lead investment since the crisis has been substantially less productive, at least in the short term [2]. Infrastructure and real-estate investment is doing much less for future GDP growth than prior investments in capital equipment for manufacturing, exports etc.
The bigger concern in the financing of this investment binge. IMO there is a very real risk of substantial civil unrest in China when the massive credit bubble comes apart.
The FT put out a much more extensive treatment of these issues a couple of days ago:
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/07/17/1554582/when-does-a-ch...
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incremental_Capital-Output_Rati...
[2] http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303...