The judgement itself is worth reading; it is not nearly as polemical as it being made out to be. It goes into detail on the question of how the states of Missouri and Louisiana have standing here; the “letter of the law” answer is that there is extensive precedent for determining whether states have standing in cases like this and the judge determined this case clearly passes the tests set by those precedents, while the “spirit of the law” answer (also given in the ruling) is that millions of citizens of Missouri and Louisiana have had their constitutional rights (both state and federal) interfered with by the plaintiffs, and as states are charged with upholding their citizens’ rights, they have standing to seek injunctions to protect those rights.
Again, I encourage you to read the ruling. It addresses this claim quite thoroughly:
> Traditionally, the First Amendment imposes limitations only on “state action, not action by private parties.” Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
> However, plaintiffs “may establish a First Amendment claim based on private conduct if that conduct ‘can fairly be seen as state action.'” Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)).
> the Court instructed that “[i]t is axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Id. (quoting Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 267 F.Supp. 458, 475-476 (M.D. Ala.), affd sub nom. Wallace v. U S, 389 U.S. 215 (1967)).
Essentially: yes, you do not have a right to post on Twitter, you cannot sue Twitter for violating your First Amendment rights. But the courts have repeatedly affirmed that this does not create a loophole for the government to launder unconstitutional acts through private parties.
