You don't know there's nothing inherently unsafe about the handling characteristics, that's a Boeing talking point. You're not qualified to make that determination, and the regulators didn't bother to make it either.
> The purpose of MCAS was just to prevent the need for pilots to recertify by masking the difference
This is a Boeing talking-point as well. The real purpose of MCAS might be to make an otherwise wildly-unsafe plane flyable, and without it it's a disaster waiting to happen. Again, we don't actually know how safe the plane is without it.
I mean, sure, there might turn out to be safety issues that we don't yet know about. You could say that about any plane.
>The real purpose of MCAS might be to make an otherwise wildly-unsafe plane flyable
MCAS would never activate in a typical flight, so I don't think it can be that bad.
There's a simple and plausible explanation for why MCAS was added (the desire to maintain the same type rating). That explanation doesn't entail that the 737 MAX had fundamentally unsafe handling characteristics, only that its handling characteristics differed significantly from those of other 737s. I'll stick with that explanation absent evidence to the contrary.
> MCAS would never activate in a typical flight, so I don't think it can be that bad.
Also untrue. There have been plenty of flights where MCAS has activated (either American or Southwest released some data about the number of MCAS activations they had without crash incident). We (the public) don't have any data regarding a flight where MCAS would-have activated but was disabled. In the cases where we know MCAS was disabled, those aiframes are now destroyed.
> There's a simple and plausible explanation for why MCAS was added (the desire to maintain the same type rating).
The benign name "Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System" is in itself a Boeing-talking point. What it it was called the "Thrust-Input Anti-Stall System?". It's completely a Boeing talking point that why MCAS was added, it might not actually reflect reality. We don't have any incentive to trust Boeing or the FAA in this case, in fact, we have just the opposite, they appear to have been deliberately misleading.
> I'll stick with that explanation absent evidence to the contrary.
We already have evidence Boeing withheld the amount of authority it gave MCAS counter to what they told the FAA. We already know the FAA didn't actually review the software implementation. We know Boeing and the FAA didn't initiate any meaningful investigation after the first Lion Air crash. WTF should we believe a single word they say? They're liars.
I think you're in conspiracy mode on this one. Boeing has shown incompetence and stupidity, and there's a good chance that someone should be held criminally liable. But I see no reason to doubt what Boeing says about why MCAS was added. What would lead me to doubt it is a more plausible alternative hypothesis, which you haven't provided.
> There have been plenty of flights where MCAS has activated
I'm sure there have, but as I said, it would not activate at all on a typical flight.
It has though. There have been several articles about reports filed by pilot's where uncommanded nose down occurred, that the root cause was not ascertained for. This is reported at a minimum here.
These are by definition "typical flights" until the anomaly occurs.
Also, keep in mind, AoA sensors have long been a luxury for pilots, since they tend to learn the envelope in terms of glide slope, and they are trained to be able to safely operate aircraft without it.
The MAX took a historically non-critical component, and added it to a safety critical process.
I understand that with the sheer number of different points in the timeline of the design, deployment, and operation of these craft, that trying to hold all the context in your head at the same time does make it feel like
"Damnit Jim, we've entered crackpot territory!"
Nevertheless, we have to remain vigilant and open to the fact that malfeasance does happen, and those that would commit it also go out of their way to make it as hard to bring into the open (if intentional), or frequently disincentivize any activity that could potentially make the issue easier to observe since the path of least resistance typically by definition involves minimizing points of inspection or other forms of scrutiny (if the malfeasance is merely the result unintentional misguidedness/incompetence).
> The purpose of MCAS was just to prevent the need for pilots to recertify by masking the difference
This is a Boeing talking-point as well. The real purpose of MCAS might be to make an otherwise wildly-unsafe plane flyable, and without it it's a disaster waiting to happen. Again, we don't actually know how safe the plane is without it.